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David Newbery1 
Energy Policy Research Group,  
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Executive Summary 
In the July Spending Review 2015 the Chancellor set out the task for the UK 
economy of living within its means and repairing public finances. The Budget 
aims to repair public finances while the Spending Review aims to control public 
expenditure. Energy policy impacts both sides of the budget balance – taxes and 
charges generate revenue while support for decarbonisation, energy efficiency 
and renewables requires financial support, much of which is directly funded by 
charges or taxes levied on energy consumers. The present pattern of taxation, 
charging, and providing support has accumulated over time in a haphazard way 
without the kind of strategic thinking that a long-term economic plan requires. 
This briefing note sets out the sound economic and public finance principles that 
could guide the reform of energy taxes and supports. 
 
EMR, the LCF and reforming renewables support 
This note concentrates on the electricity sector as that has been the subject of the 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) in the recent Energy Act 2013 and is where the 
fiscal problems are most immediately apparent. Support to zero-carbon 
electricity (until the end of the decade entirely renewables) is escalating rapidly, 
and has more than trebled from £(2012) 992 million in 2007/8 to £3,138 m. in 
2013/14 and is projected to treble again to £9.100 m. in 2020/21. These amounts 
would be considerably lower if the Renewables Obligation (RO) Scheme had 
been ended with the introduction of Contracts for Difference (CfDs) under the 
EMR, and the RO scheme should be replaced as soon as possible with CfD 
auctions, perhaps with just a single pot (or perhaps two if off-shore wind is 
                                                 
1 The author is a member of DECC’s independent Panel of Technical Experts but is writing in his 
academic capacity and drawing only on published evidence, so that the views expressed here are 
his alone and cannot be attributed to DECC. I am indebted to the careful comments by my EPRG 
colleagues on this note and the highly productive interactions EPRG provides 
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necessary to meet targets). The 2015 CfD auction demonstrated that the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) could be lowered by 3.3% real, potentially saving 
£2.5 billion per year by 2020 and thereafter for 15 years, and perhaps more if the 
RO scheme is ended earlier than 2017. Properly funding a development bank on 
the German KfW model could leverage private capital and lower the cost of 
capital, and it is disappointing that the Green Investment Bank never achieved 
scale and is likely to be privatized.  
The contracts can be further improved by paying only up to a limited 
number of MWh/MW capacity either per year or over a 10-15 year period. In the 
longer run a move to capacity auctions with payment on availability might better 
suit the objectives behind the renewables support programme. 
Similarly, the Feed-in Tariff schemes, which have grown from £(2012)15 
m. to £690 m. in four years, should be either replaced by CfD auctions for larger 
schemes, or massively scaled back for smaller schemes to cost parity with the 
revealed CfD prices, avoiding further regressive transfers to wealthier 
households for whom they are an excessively generous financial investment that 
should logically be subject to the same taxes as interest and dividends. 
 
Reforming energy taxation 
UK energy charges and taxes are a mess and need reform according to standard 
good public finance practice. Energy (both gas and electricity) should be subject 
to standard rate VAT, and all charges for environmental purposes (climate 
change mitigation, R&D and deployment support) should be financed from 
general taxation (whose receipts will be adequately enhanced by raising energy 
VAT from 5% to 20%). This would avoid subjecting production to distortive 
revenue raising charges and restore competitiveness, as production does not bear 
VAT costs and lowering environmental charges will reduce their costs . Now is 
an excellent time to do this as energy prices have fallen. The Carbon Price 
Support (CPS) should ideally be reinstated on its original trajectory, and its 
adverse competitive impact will be offset by exempting industry from 
environmental charges. Clearly it would be desirable if other EU countries also 
accepted the logic of the CPS, failing which it is understandable that the CPS may 
need moderating, and the shortfall in carbon pricing addressed through higher 
supports to low-carbon energy.  
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1. The Government’s long-term economic plan 
In the July Spending Review 20152 the Chancellor set out the task for the UK 
economy of living within its means and repairing public finances. The Budget 
aims to repair public finances while the Spending Review aims to control public 
expenditure. Energy policy impacts both sides of the budget balance – taxes and 
charges generate revenue while support for decarbonisation, energy efficiency 
and renewables requires financial support, much of which is directly funded by 
charges or taxes levied on energy consumers. The present pattern of taxation, 
charging, and providing support has accumulated over time in a haphazard way 
without the kind of strategic thinking that a long-term economic plan requires. 
This briefing note sets out the sound economic and public finance principles that 
could guide the reform of energy taxes and supports. 
The Chancellor bases his case on the need to reduce the deficit and cut the 
public debt, but the health of public finances depends on the asset as well as the 
liability side of the public sector balance sheet. If debt is issued to fund profitable 
investments that have a higher rate of return than the cost of borrowing, then the 
country’s balance sheet of assets and liabilities is strengthened, not weakened. At 
present, and certainly for the near-term foreseeable future, the cost of 
Government borrowing is at an all-time low in both real and nominal terms. 
Low-carbon technologies are inherently capital-intensive but have low variable 
costs, so the cost of delivering power from such technologies is highly sensitive 
to the cost of finance. At low rates of discount, nuclear power and mature 
renewable technologies become more attractive, as do many other infrastructure 
investments such as transport projects and those with a long-term pay-off, 
notably research and development. 
There is a serious danger that the combination of policy instability and an 
insistence of funding energy projects entirely from private finance and foreign 
direct investment will considerably raise the cost of low-carbon power and 
adversely impact energy consumers. In contrast, Germany has been very 
successful in mobilising public funds for such investments through development 
banks like KfW, which mobilises private capital cost effectively through its AAA 
                                                 
2 At https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-review-2015-a-country-that-lives-
within-its-means  
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government backed rating.3 To cite a 2013 post by Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance:4  “Europe has seen the most investment from development banks since 
2007, receiving roughly half of the global total ($217bn). Most of these funds 
came from KfW, the German development bank, and the European Investment 
Bank.” Such investments create productive capital, in contrast to public bail-outs 
of banks, which, while essential for ensuring future private sector financing, 
merely restore private sector balance sheets. While it might merely crowd out 
private investment if state development banks invested directly in commercially 
viable projects, there is a potentially strong case for providing public sector 
equity and debt finance to projects that require subsidy as the cheapest way of 
providing that subsidy. 
Even if the pro-growth concept of a publicly financed development bank 
is currently unappealing (witness the haste with which the Green Investment 
Bank is to be privatized), there remains the urgent need to create a financial 
environment that is fit for the purpose of meeting our legislated climate change 
targets. This note will concentrate on electricity, which is currently the more 
urgent priority, and then address the taxation of other energy sectors once the 
principles have been set out. 
2. Electricity taxes, charges, and support mechanisms 
Good economic policy requires not just that the Government controls its own 
expenditure wisely, but that it designs policies that deliver its objectives at least 
cost for the public as well. The UK’s energy and climate change policies have 
been largely designed to put the cost of meeting these objectives on consumers 
through charges, but the Office of National Statistics treated them as taxes, while 
the payments to those providing the services are public expenditure. They both 
appear in the Budget but they offset each other so their impact is neutral. To 
control a part of the resulting cost, the Government introduced the Levy Control 
Framework (LCF) as part of Electricity Market Reform (EMR).  The LCF covers 
the Renewables Obligation (RO), Feed-In Tariffs (FITs, including the Contracts 
for Differences, CfDs) and Warm Home Discount (WHD). The LCF is set at £7.6 
                                                 
3 See https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-Entwicklungsbank/  
4 At http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/development-banks-finance-record-amount-in-clean-
energy/  
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bn for 2020/21 (in 2011/12) prices or about 0.4 of 1% of projected 2020 GDP. It is 
important to recognize that the LCF does not cover a range of other substantial 
expenditures including energy efficiency programmes such as ECO and others 
shown in Figure 3, capacity payments (of about £1 billion from 2018/19) and CCS 
demo plants and other R&D (NAO, 2013). 
EMR attempted to improve the efficiency of meeting the UK’s climate 
change and renewables targets, but is facing pressure to scale back various 
support schemes. Figure 1 gives expenditure out-turns and projections for one 
set of supports to renewable energy, through the RO Scheme (issuing Renewable 
Obligation Certificates, ROCs) for larger renewable schemes, FiTs for smaller 
schemes, and the CfDs intended to replace ROCs by 2017. 
Figure 1 shows that the LCF limit of £7.6 billion in 2020/21 is in danger of 
being breached, for three main reasons. The first is that the RO Scheme continues 
at its very generous levels when logically its replacement by CfDs should have 
been signalled at the 2011 RO Rebanding Review. The RO scheme should have 
ended when the CfDs were launched in early 2014, not 2017. As shown below, 
auctioning CfDs would have reduced the support costs considerably. 
 
Figure 1 Past and projected expenditure on zero-carbon electricity support 
Sources: past FiTs and ROCs from Ofgem annual reports, projections: DECC (2015b) 
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The second less important reason is that the fall in gas coal and carbon 
prices has reduced the price of electricity and increased the gap between the CfD 
strike price and the wholesale price, although Figure 1 shows that this only 
becomes significant after 2017/18. The fall in fuel prices was outside the 
Government’s control but the Treasury’s Carbon Price Support (CPS) set in the 
2011 Budget was frozen in the 2014 Budget, contributing to a lower future 
wholesale electricity price set by fossil fuels. A higher CPS would have generated 
more tax revenue and reduced support costs. 
Finally, the 2014 capacity auction procured too much domestic capacity 
for 2018/19 through a failure to include the contribution that interconnectors 
make to security of supply (a mistake since rectified under pressure from DG 
COMP). More future capacity means lower future wholesale prices and higher 
CfD payments. The cost of the capacity procured of about £1 billion per year is 
not covered by the LCF, as it is intended to be a lower cost means of securing 
capacity adequacy for electricity consumers. 
Running the RO scheme in parallel with CfDs had several adverse effects. 
The administrative strike prices that DECC proposed had to make the new 
scheme as attractive as the RO scheme to demonstrate its success, but assumed 
that developers would require almost as high a return on capital as the RO 
scheme. DECC (2013b) estimated that the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) for on-shore wind might fall from 8.3% under the RO scheme to 7.9% 
with a CfD, or by 0.4% (all real). These strike prices were used in the transitional 
(FIDeR) contracts, strongly criticized as too generous by the National Audit 
Office (NAO, 2014). 
DG COMP was critical of the failure to market test the state aids offered 
through the CfDs. In response the Government announced an auction for CfDs 
(DECC, 2014a) with three separate pots for technologies of varying degrees of 
maturity.5 Developers submit sealed bids chosen in order of increasing strike 
price regardless of the delivery date. If there are inadequate bids for any pot then 
the developers receive the administratively set and published strike prices. The 
first CfD auction was held in February 2015, and results are presented in Table 1. 
                                                 
5 https://lowcarboncontracts.uk/system/files/round_2_operational_plan_v2.pdf  
  
7 
 
The 27 successful projects will receive subsidies of £315 million per year by 
2020/21. The solar bid of £50/MWh for 2015/16 was an incompetent bid and has 
not been registered, so it fails to receive a CfD.  
Table 1 CfD Auction Allocation: Round 1 
Technology   
admin 
price 
lowest 
clearing 
price 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19  
Total 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Advanced Conversion  £/MWh £140 £114.39 
  
£119.89 £114.39   
Technologies MW     
  
36 26 62 
Energy from Waste with  £/MWh £80 £80 
   
£80.00   
Combined Heat and Power MW     
   
94.75 94.75 
Offshore wind £/MWh £140 £114.39 
  
£119.89 £114.39   
  MW     
  
714 448 1162 
Onshore wind £/MWh £95 £79.23 
 
£79.23 £79.99 £82.50   
  MW     
 
45 77.5 626.05 748.55 
Solar PV £/MWh £120 £50.00 £50.00 £79.23 
  
  
  MW     32.88 36.67     69.55 
Source: DECC (2015b) 
Table 1 shows the clearing prices were often substantially below the 
administered prices (now price caps). The excess level of the WACC can be 
computed from Table 1 using cost estimates (DECC, 2013a) and price forecasts 
(DECC, 2014b). The internal rates of return (IRRs) for on-shore wind for varying 
values of the capacity factor (CF), capital cost (capex), and opex are shown in 
table 2. The column “IRR admin” gives the IRR using these cost assumptions but 
taking the administered price to determine revenues, while that labelled “IRR 
auction” uses the auction strike price, and “IRR difference”, shows the reduction 
in the IRR from moving from the administered to the auction prices. Changes in 
assumptions are in red, emboldened and italicized. 
Table 2 Differences in the internal rate of return for on-shore wind 
CF capex fixed opex var opex IRR IRR IRR 
  £/kW £kWyr £/MWh admin auction difference 
25% £1,600 £30 £5 6.8% 3.5% 3.3% 
25% £1,800 £30 £5 5.1% 2.0% 3.1% 
28% £1,600 £30 £5 8.9% 5.4% 3.5% 
25% £1,600 £45 £5 5.4% 2.0% 3.4% 
25% £1,600 £20 £5 7.7% 4.5% 3.2% 
25% £1,600 £30 £2 7.4% 4.2% 3.2% 
Source: own calculations 
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Although there are considerable differences in the IRRs from varying the 
technology assumptions (particularly the CF), the variations in the reduction in 
the IRRs are small, suggesting that the lowering of the WACC of some 3% real 
per year is robust. If the implied WACC is reduced by 3.3% through auctions 
then the saving on generation investment of £75 billion up to 2020 (DECC, 2011) 
would be £2.5 billion per year by 2020, continuing for 15 years. This may 
underestimate the potential savings, as unsuccessful auction bidders for the first 
two years expected to be able to fall back on the RO Scheme that runs until 2017. 
If the RO scheme had been ended at the date of introducing the CfDs, then there 
would have been no fall-back, no need to ensure equality of returns for the CfDs 
and ROCs, and hence lower prices in the CfD auction and even larger savings.  
On 17th June 2015 the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 
announced that the RO Scheme for on-shore wind would be ended early, with no 
future support for on-shore wind, the cheapest large-scale renewable option. If 
the early closure of the RO scheme implied relying solely on CfD auctions for all 
technologies, then it would be a sensible, if over-due, policy change. If the aim 
was to end any support for on-shore wind to pacify local opposition, it was 
unnecessary, given that powers to rule against local schemes was devolved to 
local authorities in this announcement. If the reason was concern that the Levy 
Control Framework would be breached, then closing the cheapest option but not 
the far more expensive off-shore wind and tidal lagoons makes no sense. 
At the heart of a well-functioning government, the Treasury should be 
ensuring that we get value for money from our investments and policies. Mature 
renewables are supported as part of our climate change objective, and Table 1 
demonstrates that some are now competitive with nuclear power, although 
intermittent renewables like wind and solar PV impose additional balancing 
costs and reserve requirements on the system. All zero-carbon generation needs 
long-term contracts at above current market prices as carbon is under-priced, 
contracts lower the WACC and to allay concerns over policy instability. The 
social cost of carbon (SCC) is much higher than the EU Allowance price and also 
higher than the current Carbon Price Floor (the earlier CPF projected £70/tonne 
by 2030 that was then considered the required level for new nuclear power and 
may be a better estimate of the medium term SCC).  
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Less mature renewables should be additionally supported for the value of 
their learning spill-overs. Increased deployment drives down costs and lowers 
future investment costs for us and makes them more attractive for other 
countries, further reducing global carbon emissions which impact on us. That 
was the primary logic behind the EU Renewables Directive, which was an 
intelligent way to ensure that each country contributed to the total EU ambition. 
Unfortunately, the Directive fails to distinguish between renewables with high 
spill-overs from those with no spill-overs at all (tidal lagoons, which is a mature 
technology – we have been building dams for centuries – and required to 
compete with similarly mature options). 
As a further contribution to reducing expenditure, phasing out FiTs makes 
sense for several reasons. First, expensive small-scale schemes are less efficient 
than utility-scale renewables for electricity generation (MIT, 2015). Now that 
there is a global market for domestic scale solar PV, much of the initial learning 
has already taken place and needs little further support. Utility scale renewables 
should be auctioned under the CfD scheme. Second, the kinds of households that 
install solar PV are primarily attracted by the high real rates of return that they 
can earn compared to indexed bonds or other secure financial products. The 
returns to these have declined and so too should the returns offered to 
households, providing the prices they pay for the electricity they displace or sell 
properly reflects its value (including the social cost of carbon). If FiTs are 
retained, then announcing aggressive degressions encourages a more 
competitive early market and can always be adjusted upwards if necessary 
without alarming investors in the way revising them down does. Taxing their 
income as dividends also makes sense. 
Phasing out the RO Scheme as soon as possible and replacing it with, if 
necessary, a more restricted set of pots for CfD auctions should deliver the most 
cost-effective way of meeting our renewables targets. In addition, the CfD strike 
prices set by the auction should be nominal, not indexed, as that (slightly) front-
end loads the payments, which is more attractive to investors, and also nominal 
bonds are more liquid than indexed bonds. There is a case for only offering the 
auctioned strike price for, say, the first 2,000 MWh/MW capacity each year, to 
avoid over-paying for high wind locations, on the German model (or paying for 
a certain number of cumulative MWh/MW over a 10-15 year period). That 
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should give roughly equal payments per MW capacity installed. Location 
decisions will then be more efficiently guided by the current locational 
transmission charges. 
There is also a good case for paying for capacity availability rather than 
output, if the aim is to encourage deployment, as this would better meet the 
underlying objectives of the Renewables Directive, but as the target is set in MWh 
in 2020 that may be a step too far without reforming the Renewables Directive.  
 
3. Reforming renewables support and the Levy Control Framework 
The Energy Act 2013 aimed to replace the RO scheme in 2017 but meanwhile offer 
CfDs with FiTs that would reduce the risk of volatile wholesale prices. The 
Energy Union Package was launched on 25 Feb (COM(2015) 80) with the statement 
that: 
“… renewable production needs to be supported through market-based schemes 
that address market failures, ensure cost-effectiveness and avoid 
overcompensation or distortion. Low-cost financing for capital intensive 
renewables depends on having a stable investment framework that reduces 
regulatory risk.”  (EC, 2015) 
Action Point 5 reiterated the aim of “integrating renewables in the market …” 
and proposing “a new European electricity market design in 2015, which will be 
followed by legislative proposals in 2016.” This Commission proposal would 
seem to reverse the logic, painfully learned in the UK, of moving from Premium 
FiTs like the RO Scheme to FiTs with their revenue guarantee and hence reduced 
risk and WACC. German, Spanish and Italian evidence all demonstrates that a 
well-designed FiT can be cost-effective (with suitable degression tracking falling 
costs), lead to rapid deployment, and encourage the cost reductions that are the 
logic behind the Renewables Directive. Does that mean that we should abandon 
what seems to be an effective instrument in the CfD with FiT (to give it its proper 
EMR name)? 
There are two good reasons for linking payments to wholesale prices and 
requiring Renewable Energy Supply from Electricity (RES-E) to pay for 
balancing services. As the volume of a specific type of RES-E increases in a local 
market area (South German PV is an excellent example) so the output in 
favourable conditions (sun in this case) will massively increase, depressing 
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wholesale prices in those hours. If this fall in prices is signalled back to the 
developers, then they will adjust their supply and reallocate to better locations 
(in terms of revenue, which may be higher in less sunny locations). If the price 
they receive is independent of the spot price, this efficient signal will be 
suppressed, raising the cost of deploying renewables. In addition, PV has a rapid 
fall-off as evening approaches, requiring rapid replacement, which puts stress on 
the ramp rates of back-up plant. Paying for the new ancillary services (ramping, 
frequency response, inertia) that high RES-E requires is a cost caused by that 
RES-E and needs to be reflected in their support costs, most logically by 
requiring the operators to purchase these services. 
The counter argument is that exposing RES-E to uncertain market 
conditions undermines the risk and cost reducing properties of the classic FiT. 
Instead, it merely raises the delayed question of how RES-E should be supported. 
The logic of the Renewables Directive is solving the club good problem of 
financing deployment to reap the dynamic economies of scale (learning-by-
doing), which is primarily about the design, location and installation of the RES-
E plant, and less about its operation (which, if it is mature enough to warrant 
mass deployment, should primarily depend on the resource, wind or sun). This 
would suggest paying for availability rather than output, or per MW rather than 
per MWh. This would make renewables just like capacity in the capacity auction, 
as the aim would be to identify the “missing money” needed to justify 
deployment, while providing a long-term contract for availability that addresses 
the “missing (futures) market” problem (Newbery, 1989; 2015).  
To reduce risk further, balancing and other ancillary services could be 
procured competitively by the System Operator and the RES-E developer offered 
a cost-reflective contract, whose cost would be factored into the auction for 
capacity availability. Other aggregators or supply companies could offer Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for the metered output, based on a prediction of 
the local wholesale price, further reducing transaction costs and risks.  
 
3.1. The Levy Control Framework 
The problem with the current system of funding CfDs is that the Government is 
underwriting an unknown level of support, as the subsidy depends on the 
difference between a known strike price and an unknown wholesale price. 
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Various imperfections in the current zero-carbon subsidy regime could be 
simultaneously addressed by a capacity auction for competitively supplied zero-
carbon mature generation (PV, on-shore wind, and perhaps later, off-shore 
wind). This would provide an fixed nominal annual payment for available 
capacity that could be used immediately to back a debt instrument used to build 
the plant. As noted above, there are good reasons for not indexing payments as 
in the current CfDs, as this back-end loads payments, reduces their value to the 
market, and goes in the opposite direction of liquid financial markets, which 
issue nominal debt. 
Each technology would attract a standard de-rating factor (as in the 
current capacity auction), such that their de-rated capacity would be comparable 
across technologies in terms of value for money. The amount of funding 
available would be pre-determined and hence known, avoiding the uncertainties 
of the LCF. The support would be targeted to achieve its purpose of driving 
down costs, and not unnecessarily over-rewarding favoured locations (wind in 
Scotland or Shetland), as the output is electricity which ought to be considered as 
equal to all other electrons.6 Failure to treat electrons equally leads to such 
distortions as negative prices, and an apparent willingness to pay for lengthy 
transmission reinforcements (such as the Bootstraps connecting Scotland by sub-
sea links to England) at twice what they are really worth. 
The next question is what to do if the current LCF risks being breached. 
This will depend on the policy question of whether we intend to meet our RES 
target, which under all current Future Energy Scenarios except Gone Green, we 
are likely to miss (National Grid, 2015). If the Government is serious about these 
targets, and concerned at affordability, then it needs to replace the RO Scheme as 
soon as legal with CfD (or preferably, RES capacity) auctions, as it has done for 
on-shore wind and roof-top PV. It then needs to make an estimate of the cost of 
reaching the targets and budget accordingly, with the advantage of the extra 
revenue streams arising from increasing the VAT rates on energy to the standard 
rate. To the extent that falling energy prices are one reason for rising levy claims, 
                                                 
6 “ought” here means that the RES Directive, which encourages output not investment, is flawed 
and thus encourages the UK and others to support the wrong aspect of the technologies. It would 
be desirable to start making that case when the EU comes to benchmarking Member State 
performance. 
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the need to protect consumers that was the reason for the LCF, that reason for the 
breach is unimportant. 
This should also mean having a single pot for all near-mature 
technologies, and deciding whether and how much innovation funding of 
immature technologies is justified. It is a nonsense to set large sums of money 
aside for tidal lagoons which are a mature technology with no learning spill-
overs. Some of the more expensive (e.g. deeper water round 3) off-shore wind 
might benefit from awaiting further cost reductions. If off-shore wind is pursued 
to avoid disturbing local communities with on-shore wind, there is a case for 
compensating local communities for accepting on-shore wind. Some fraction of 
the extra cost that avoiding off-shore wind would save, given that off-shore wind 
is costing up to £114.39/MWh (table 1) would be the natural approach. It may 
then be worth considering whether some part of the off-shore excess cost is a 
larger learning spill-over than for on-shore wind, in which case that might be 
separately identified and paid as an addition to the revenue from competing 
against on-shore wind in the auction.  
4. Taxes, subsidies and State Aid 
Setting taxes and subsidies on fuels and various energy-related activities lies 
within the full control of the Treasury, but is, surprisingly, the least studied part 
of energy policy. This is doubly surprising as there are clear principles from 
public economics to guide the setting of such instruments (Diamond and 
Mirrlees, 1971; Newbery, 2005). It is worth revisiting these principles given the 
growing weight of taxes and levies intended to fund the increasingly costly 
subsidies to renewable energy and energy efficiency programmes (such as the 
alphabet soup of CERT, FiTs, ROCs, CfDs and ECO shown in figure 3). 
Figure 2 shows the wide variation across countries in both the rates of tax 
and of charges for renewable energy, transforming Denmark from one of the 
cheapest countries before taxes and charges to the most expensive after these 
imposts. The high cost of renewables in Germany is also noteworthy, as is the 
low rate of tax in the UK, which levies a reduced rate of VAT at 5% on energy 
instead of the standard rate of 20%. 
The varying treatment of levies and taxes was drawn into sharp relief in 
the European Commission consultation on the draft Environmental and Energy Aid 
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Guidelines issued in December, 2013.7  DG COMP is particularly hostile to the 
selective (i.e. discriminatory) remission of such levies that some member states 
(notably Germany) provide to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries. 
 
Figure 2 Taxes and charges on domestic electricity in EU15, 2012 
Sources: DECC Quarterly Energy Prices 2013 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/244580/qep_sep_
13.pdf  with breakdown from ACER (2013) applied to tax inclusive price 
This consultation raised a number of important issues – whether these 
levies and charges are taxes, whether industry should be exempt from such 
charges, how revenue for supporting low-carbon energy should be raised, and 
more generally, how to define a subsidy. More recently, DG ENER 
commissioned Ecofys (2014) to define and collect data on energy taxes and 
subsidies across the EU, and these fortunately (for the most part) have been 
guided by the well-established principles of modern public finance.8 
 
                                                 
7 Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_state_aid_environment/index_en.html. 
8 One notable exception is the notion of the external cost of the depletion of natural resources, 
which they estimate accounts for 22% of total external costs. Such costs are pecuniary not 
physical externalities and therefore should not be included. 
Build-up of final retail domestic price 2012
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Fra
nc
e
Fin
lan
d
Gr
ee
ce
Sw
ed
en
De
nm
ark
Lu
xe
mb
ou
rg
Au
str
ia
Ge
rm
an
y
Be
lgi
um
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Ita
ly GB
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ain
Ire
lan
d
Eu
ro
ce
nt
s/
kW
h
renewables charge
taxes
network
margin
day-ahead price
  
15 
 
5. Principles of good public finance 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) argued that revenue-raising taxes should not 
distort production, but should fall on final consumers. The only taxes and 
subsidies that should be targeted on production are those that correct otherwise 
inefficient prices for various externalities. Pollution taxes (including carbon 
taxes) are the standard example, while a Value Added Tax has the desirable 
property of falling on final consumption while exempting production. 
Logically, while DG COMP is correct to criticize the selective exemption of 
these purely revenue-raising levies and charges, the correct solution is to make 
the exemption universal for all production activities, not just for energy-intensive 
industries. Politically this may appear at first sight unattractive as it would seem 
to increase taxes on voting taxpayers, but this is primarily a problem of 
perception, as these levies and charges on industry fall even more heavily on 
final consumers as they add additional costs and distortions to the final products 
(not to mention that some industries may exit and impose further costs in the 
form of unemployment). The fact that the former coalition Government, under 
pressure from the opposition to reduce rapidly rising electricity prices, felt the 
need to transfer some charges on electricity to general taxation in late 2013 
demonstrates that attempts to disguise taxes as levies are not necessarily 
politically successful strategies, even if they seemed appealing at the time of first 
introduction. This becomes particularly unappealing when the charges fall 
disproportionately on poorer households and are in part used to provide 
generous subsidies to richer households who install PV panels (Chawla and 
Pollitt, 2013, figure 5). 
The second insight of public economics is that broad-based taxes are less 
distorting than narrowly based taxes, and that it is difficult to find good 
arguments against a uniform rate of VAT as the best form of indirect taxes for 
raising revenue (Deaton and Stern, 1986). The argument that electricity should be 
subject to a lower rate of VAT because it is income inelastic – that is its use rises 
less quickly across households than income and so accounts for a larger share of 
low income than high income households – is fallacious, as it would be more 
equitable to charge at the standard rate and make uniform lump sum payments 
(e.g. universal access to education and health, which is the form in which lump 
sum transfers are primarily made), than to give subsidies (the difference between 
the standard and lower VAT rate) that increase with income. 
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It thus follows that the revenue needed to finance renewables and other 
public goods should come from general taxation raised in the least distorting 
ways consistent with distributional objectives – either through income taxes or a 
uniform rate of VAT, and not by selectively charging single products like 
electricity.  
 
6. Restructuring charges and taxes 
Figure 3 shows that environmental charges made up 12% of the total electricity 
bill of £603 in 2015, while figure 1 (above) showed that this is set to rise rapidly 
under current policies as CfDs start falling on consumer bills. Note that the 
carbon price (through the EU Emissions Trading System, ETS and CPS) are 
included in the wholesale electricity price and do not appear as environmental 
charges, nor does the levy on consumers to pay for Ofgem’s Network Innovation 
Competitions (which is designed to lower future consumer bills and so may 
better be considered as an investment).  
 
 
Figure 3 Breakdown of average household electricity bill (3,200 kWh costing 
£603) at March 2015 
Source: Ofgem at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/charts-outlook-
costs-make-energy-bills accessed 28.7.15 
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The Guardian noted on 2nd April 20159 that “The carbon floor price went 
up from £9.54 to £18.08 per tonne of CO2, raising the cost of a tonne of carbon 
(sic) for British power plants to £23, when allowances on the EU’s emissions 
trading system (ETS) are factored in.” The social cost10 of CO2 is the external cost 
of all future damage discounted to the present, and as DECC points out, is 
conceptually different from the market price shown in the ETS. Its value is 
problematic, and the Government distinguishes between the price for the sectors 
covered by the ETS and the non-covered sectors, for which the price is much 
higher -  £(2015)63/tonne.11 If the social cost of carbon were set at £30/tonne (the 
2020 original target for the CPF), given that the average emissions intensity of 
electricity is 500 kg/MWh, the shortfall is £22/tonne CO2 or £11/MWh. On a bill of 
3.2 MWh that would add £35 to the bill. If we deduct the inappropriately levied 
net (after the Government financed rebate) environmental charges of £70 and 
add back the £35 the pre-tax bill (before the £29 VAT) would be £526. Adding 
VAT at 20% of £105 gives the final bill as £631, only 5% higher than the current 
bill, an almost unnoticeable impact of this desirable tax change. 
Similarly, the same source gives the 2015 domestic gas bill as £709 for 13.5 
MWht, which currently includes no carbon price, although at £30/t CO2 and 
184kg/MWht the missing carbon cost is £6/MWht and the shortfall on VAT (20% 
not 5%), currently £62, is £186, which, with the carbon cost, would add £193 to 
the bill, a rise of 27%. Fortunately, gas prices are falling, so this is the ideal time 
to make the tax change for both fuels. 
Both of these principles need to recognize constraints in setting other 
taxes, of which the most relevant is a proper carbon tax. Ideally the EU should 
reform the ETS to given an adequate carbon price, as part of a global deal to 
internalize the climate change externality of releasing greenhouse gases. That 
would remove the case for the rather distorting UK Carbon Price Support. 
Further illustrations of the illogicality of levying lower rates of VAT on energy 
while levying charges for production subsidies (mostly to renewables, some to 
                                                 
9 At http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/apr/02/carbon-floor-price-hike-will-trigger-
uk-coal-slowdown-say-analysts  
10 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/carbon-valuation--2#social-cost-of-carbon  
11 See http://www.forestry.gov.uk/fr/infd-7wtdju  
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nuclear power) comes from the recent Ecofys (2014) report which examines the 
subsidies and costs of EU energy.   
Figure 4, taken from Ecofys (2014), shows the high level of UK “support to 
energy demand” (i.e. the shortfall between the taxes and charges actually levied 
on energy and the standard rate of VAT). This support is almost exactly equal to 
all the other supports in the UK and a higher proportion of the total than in 
almost all other major EU Member States (except for Belgium, Denmark and 
Sweden).  
 
Figure 4 Energy subsidies for EU member states in 2012 
Source: Ecofys (2014). 
 
That leaves the question whether the UK is taxing the industrial sector at 
the right level, given that electricity pays a carbon price (ETS plus the CPS) while 
gas pays neither, oil is heavily taxed, and coal is taxed through the Climate 
Change Levy at £0.81/GJ or £2.92/MWht. If we concentrate on electricity sold to 
the industrial sector, Figure 5 shows the UK is taxing somewhat less than the 
EU27 but this was before the CPS came into effect. 
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What is clear from figures 2 and 5 is that not all countries have the right 
answer, and therefore the internal EU market is distorted as taxes on producers 
differ widely, with Denmark, Italy and Germany well above the EU average. It 
also leaves the DG COMP question of whether exempting trade exposed sectors 
from green charges distorts competition when carbon is not properly priced in 
most EU countries. The latter would be avoided by border tax adjustments for 
carbon content, which would also pave the way for efficient EU carbon taxes, but 
the political plausibility of that policy combination is low.  
 
 
Figure 5 EU electricity prices pre- and post-tax for industry, 2012 
Source: ACER (2013), PTP is pre-tax price, POTP is post-tax price 
7. Conclusions 
The Government passed the Energy Act 2013 to reduce the cost of meeting our 
renewables target and changed to a support mechanism closer to the classic FiT. 
The move to auctions demonstrated both an appetite for this instrument and a 
considerable reduction in cost, compared to the previously announced 
administratively set strike prices. Large amounts of money were arguably poorly 
spent in the transitional arrangements paying these strike prices, confirming that 
although FiTs can be cheap, there must be some mechanism to link the support 
price to the actual cost – and auctions appear the best way. 
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The Energy Union Package now argues for market-based schemes. This has 
some logic but it needs to be reconciled with a sufficiently stable investment 
climate that allocates risk to those best placed to bear them while providing the 
incentives for efficiency. This briefing note argues that capacity contracts with 
suitable PPAs and contracts for ancillary and balancing services (with all 
contracts reflecting efficient market value) are a logical solution and allow 
progress to a zero subsidy regime for mature RES-E post 2020, provided the 
carbon price is set or supported at an adequate level. Adequately funding a state 
development bank on the German KfW model to leverage cheaper private capital 
would also help lower costs. 
Finally, and fortunately under the direct control of the Treasury, energy 
taxes and subsidies need to be reformed in line with principles of sound public 
finance, and the support instruments directed to better achieve their objective at 
least cost. This requires raising the energy VAT rate to the standard rate, 
financing all environmental and development public goods from general tax 
revenue, and replacing the RO scheme with capacity auctions, funded in nominal 
terms and hence with a predictable impact on the Levy Control, which will 
possibly need to be reset if the UK is serious about its EU RES target. 
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